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ABSTRACT 
The equilibrium strategy for N-person differential games can be found by 
studying a min-max problem subject to differential systems constraints [4J. 
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i 
~O. Introduction 
In Part I [4], we first gave a min-max equivalent formulation of 
equilibrium strategies in N-person differential games, and used the dual and 
the finite element methods to study and compute them. In this paper, we will 
study N-person games by another important method - the penalty approach. 
The application of the penalty method to optimal control problems, which 
are just a special case of differential games, has been studied in [3J, [5], 
for example; see also the references therein. Nevertheless, there has not 
been, to our knowledge, any application of the penalty method to saddle point 
type problems like differential games. The first main objective of our paper 
is to investigate this feasibility. Our second objective is to combine penalty 
with finite elements to compute numerical solutions and to compare them with 
those in [4] obtained from the dual method. 
We inherit some notations from (4] and define some new ones below: 





(i = 1,2, ... ,N) are, respectively, k.xn time-varying matrices; 
1 
Mi (t) (i = l,2, ••• ,N) are, respectively, symmetric m.Xm. time-varying 
1 1 
matrices, which induce positive definite linear operators M.: L 2 + L 2 ; 
1 m. m. 
1 1 
z.(t) (i = 1,2, ..• ,N) are, respectively, k.-vector valued functions; 
1 1 




LB. u. - f, x E H!, u. E L 2 , j = j=l J J J mj 1,2, ••. ,N, 
1 
2 
·i _ Axi N xiEHl, u.EL2 (j1i) 2 (DE) . 
-
x I: B .u. - B.v. - f, v.E L 
1. j1i J J 1. 1. n J m. 1. m. J 1. 
N 




X:: 1 2 N (x ,x , ••• , x ) 
HI HI n {y E HI Iy(o) = O} On - n n 
HI HI n {y E HI ly(T) = O} 





i=l m. 1. 
HI [HI ]N x U; H 2 [L2]N x U H 
-
x U x 
-
L x U x On on n n 
L: HI ~ L2 Lx x -Ax On n' -
* HI L2 * • * L : ~ L x 
-
x + A x 
nO n' . 
We proceed as follows. 
In §l, we present the fundamental penalty theorem. The rate of 
convergence with respect to the penalty parameters is determined. Our work 
here extends and generalizes the earlier result of B. T. Polyak [6]. 
In §2, we specialize to the linear-quadratic case and formulate the 
finite element variational approach. Error estimates between the computed 
and the exact solutions with respect to the penalty parameter E and the 
discretization parameter h are given. 
The relationship between the penalty method and the dual method is 
explored in §3. Their computational advantages and disadvantages are also 
compared. 
Numerical resul ts are presented in § 4. 
3 
§l. The Penalty Method for N-Person Differential Games. Rate of Convergence. 
As in [4], for an N-person game with linear dynamics 
o ~ t ~ T, 
(1.1) 
let each player have an associated cost functional Ji(x,u), 1 ~ i ~ N, which 
in the HlxU norm. 
n 
is continuous with respect to (x,u) Throughout the 
rest of the paper we assume that we have made the change of variable 
x(t) + x(t) - xo so that x(O) = O. This change of variable results only 





In this section, the costs J. need not be quadratic. 
1 
Following the min-max formulation in [4,§l], we consider 
inf 




i i 1 2 (x ,v )EHOnxL 
m. 
(DE) i=O 1 
1~1~N 
N [ i i] J(x,u;X,v) = E J.(x,u) - J.(x ,v ) 
i=l 1 1 
Here, we see that (DE) = 0 
(DE). = 0 (1 < i < N) are N+l equality constraints for the inf-sup 
1 = = 
problem (1.2). Thus, it appears natural for us to penalize the problem as 
(1.3) inf 
1 (x, ~)EHOnXU 
J (x,u;X,v) _ J(x,UjX,v) 
€ 
The most important question remains in determining the validity of the 
above scheme and, if valid, its rate of convergence. Thus, we consider the 
fundamental theorem of penalty for N-person differential games below. 
The following assumptions will be needed: 





(X,v)E[ H~ NxU 
[DE] =0 
J(x.u;X,v) loS attained by 
By (Bl), this point (i,G;x,;) 1.5 unique. Also, by [4, Theorem 2.1], 
there exist Lagrange multipliers PO' P = (Pl, ••. ,PN) such that 





[DE1 = 0 
J(x,u;X,v) 
4 
= max m1.n 




The costs J.(x,u) 1. 
J.(x,u) :: 1. 
+ <PO' (DEh 
are of the form 
T 
!Ohi(x(t),u(t»dt 





< p., (DE). >] 
1. 1. 
(B4) The first and second derivatives J', J" exist, and J" satisfies the 
global Lipschitz condition 
(1.6) 
(B5) if _ 2 A _ ,~~ > , _ ,,2 Let (;"'0 :: a J, CH1 - (.), ..:, ~ = 0 J, x _ "'~ u and &if :: ~2 J ~1 -- °v 
5 
~ -J1 order Frechet partial derivatives evaluated at (X,UA,·~,VA). Then ~ m 
A 010' 0' 1 
and -1n'1 are positive definite linear operators on L2, U, [L2JN and U, 
n n 
• 1 FhA ~ Holn x [Hu1n1 N respect1.ve y. urt ermore, ~o x"l maps .into itself; 
(2.10), (2.14» 
(B7) The mixed Frechet partial derivative operators a axJ, a a J, .•. , etc., 
x x u 
" " '" ,.. evaluated at (x,u;X,v) are all O. 
Remark 1.1 
(i) In (B3), that the J. 's are assumed to be of the form (1.5) is only 
1. 
for the convenience of discussions. 
(ii) Making some other assumptions, one can relax the global Lipschitz 
condition (1.6) to a local one. 
(iii) (B7) is assumed here only for the convenience of discussions, cf. 
Remark 1.5 later. 
Theorem 1.2 Under conditions (Bl) - (B7), for EU' E],'''. J ~ > 0 sufficiently 
(i) 
(H) 
-B.v . - f) - (-p.)1 I 2 





:; K3 ( max 
O<J'<N 
.... 
(x;i Ai A 
- Ax - 1: B.u~. 
J;i J "J 
Proof: 
(1. 7) 
u,v E U 
We introduce the new variables 
.... 
E;o = x - x 
.... 
E;l = X - X 
" nO = u - u 
N 
rO = ~ (x· - Ax - ~ B u - f) - p" ~ t. •• 0 EO i=l 1 1 
r1i 2(ei ~ = - - X E. 
1 
and then let 
B.u. 
J J 
" B.v. - f) - p. 
111 
(x,u;X,v) tend to an element in H. 
We further let 
(1.8) 
For any (ox,ou;oX,ov) E H, we have 
J'(x,UjX,v) e (ox,OUjoX,ov) = J'(x,UjX,v) e (ox,ou;oX,ov) 
E 
+ ~ < ~ - Ax - L B.u. - f, o~ - A(ox) - L B.(au.) > 
EO 1 1 1 ill 
B.ou. - B.ov. > J J 1 1 
B.u. - B.v. - f, oii - A(oxi) 
J J 1 1 
We can use (B4) to write 
6 
(1.9) 
where the remainder r(~,n) (as a linear functional in H) satisfies 
(1.10) r(o,O) = a 
(1.11) I Ir'(~,n) - r'(~,n)1 I :: C111(~ - ~,n - n)11 2 2 (L x[L ]N) x(UxU) 
n n 
Substituting (1.9) into the first term on the RHS of (1.8) and integrating 
the remaining terms by parts, we get 
(1.12 ) 
(ox,ou;cX,ov) - < (dd + A*) ~ (x - Ax - E B.u. - f), Ox > 
t e:O i 1. 1. 
+ ~ < x(T) - A(T)x(T) - E (B.u.)(T) - f(T), ox(T) > 
e::0 i 1. 1. lRn 
- E<B~ • ~ (x - Ax -1:B.u. - n, ou. > i 1. e:O 1. 1. 1. 
+ ~ d * 2 (x·1. _ Axi _ 
i. <edt + A ) • e:. 
i 1. 
B.u. - B.v. - f), oxi > J J 1. 1. 
+ 1: 1: < B~ • ~ (xi - Axi - 1: B.u. - B.v. - f), o~ > 
i k~i e:i j~i J J 1. 1. K 
* + E < B. 
i 1. 
2·i i 
• -- (x - Ax - t B.u. - B.v. - f), oVk > 
e:i j~i J J 1. 1. 




(1.13) J'(~,~;X,~) • (ox,ou;OX,ov) - <L.*Po'ox> - ~ < B: PO' QUi> 
1 
*~ i *~ *~ 
-1: <L p.,ox >-1: 1: < B.p.,ou.>-1:<B.p.,ov.>::a 0, 
i 1 i j1i J 1 1 i 1 1 1 
we get that the solution of J'(x,u;X,v) = 0 can be found by solving 
(1.14) 
8 
1: < *ri ° > r < *ri ~ > = B . "1' u. - B. "1 ,uv. j1i J J i 1 1 
Note that all the <, > 
]R.n 
terms on the RHS of (1.12) disappear because of 
the arbitrariness of ox(T) and i OX (T). By (B5) and (B7), we have 
dJo 0 0 0 r; ! 0 
0 dI, 0 0 I ;1 (1.15 ) JII(x,u;~,v)(;0!nO;~1,n1) = I nO I 0 0 ?no 0 
0 0 0 71l., ! n1 J 
Therefore, from (1.14), we get 
(1.16) 
Q'lfonO)i * * i -~ (;,n) Bil;O r Bj l;l = j1i , 1 ~ i ~ N, 
~nl)1 * i Bil;l = -r4 (;,n) 
where r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r4 are the respective components of r(;,n) and the 
superscript i denotes the i-th component. 
9 
Combining (1.16) with (1. 7.5) and (1.7.6), we get the following nonlinear 
"matrix" equation 
clio * ~O --rl(E;,n) 0 0 0 -L 0 0 
0 ell 1 0 0 0 * 0 J r-~"':. t E;1 0 -r2(~,n) 
0 0 mo 0 t13* 1 f/;* 2 nO 0 -r3 (E;,n) 
(1.17) = + 
0 0 0 m1 0 <S; n1 ' 0 -r4 (E;,n) 
-L 0 <21 0 
e:o 0 l,;O e:O '" I 0 -I -'2 Po 2 I 
r r 
I j [-I. ... 0 J Q 2'I.... I l,;1' ~ e:l l' I L 0 113 0 ...... e:N ,# 12 P1 ~ ~ 0 O. 2 




-B 1 0 -B 2 . . . . . -B N -B 1 
-B 2 -B 1 0 -B N -B 2, 0 
, 





-B N -B 1 -B 2 . . . . . 0 .I -B N 








lao ~:] , m= l~ 





- -I 2 
o 
. ~ 
- -I 2 
rr 1 (~, 11)] 
r1(t;,11)= , 
r 2 (t;,11) 
0 
1 ~= [: ~J 11lt 







By (AS), De: is a closed linear operator on 
Lemma 1.3 Under conditions (AS), (A6) and (A7), for all e:O,e:1 , ••• ,e:N > 0 





f b•• () E (2 ~ 2--; tl) ( ) (2 [Ln2] N). Proo: For an ar 1trar1ly given a,S,y Ln x LLnl x UxU x Ln x 
such that 
(1.20) 




l ~ = 
d1 ~ - Z*r, = a 
anti +t:JS~ = a 
-z~ ~Ti + I r, = y. e: 
Let ~(t,s) be the fundamental n x n matrix solution satisfying 
{ a at ~(t,s) = A(t)~(t,s) 
~(s,s) = I 
nxn 
It is easy to see that ~ is invertible with inverse 
- -1 (LJ A = t b 
Thus, we have from (1.21.3), 
(1.22) 
Substituting (1.22) into (1.21.1), we get 
1 X(s)ds. 
(N+l)X(NX1) 
--L u--1 ..:k)_ 11--1 d1 f. qjft + 'Off. I - f. l; = a +Qff. y. 
e: 
12 
The integrodifferential operator -* -1 f. -~f. I is easily seen to be invertible 
e: 
for e: = (eu,e:l' •.• '€N) sufficiently small, thus we have 
(1.23) 
Substituting (1.23) into (1.21.2), we get 
Now we invoke (B6): since nt is invertible, if ~ ~s relatively smaller 
than m such that 
(1.24) is invertible 
(for e: sufficiently small), we have 
(1.25 ) 
where 
(1.26) f. _ Z*-A--f.-lI • e: ~ e: 
Using (1.25) in (1.22) and (1.23), we obtain 
Therefore, D is invertible, with 
e: 




+ I Z:l fdlZ-~S*Z - I) 1 
e: ~ e: 
J-l *--1 e: tB I.e: 
--ll:ftrl --1 I. ~ +11.. 
e: e: e: 
13 
z-t<A!:~*Z-JA Z - I + I Z-.l 
e: e: e: e: 
l.A--L.....J\'--l" 'A--l] .~l. a1~ I. - I~t. 
J -l ~--~--l e: :a I.e: U' l. 
--1(A--1 *--1 ) l. '(Ifl. ~ c;S I. - I cIIZ-"tIJ.t 1 '-f--L..a*--l --1 '17ft. '6"0 l. - I~l. 
e: e: e: e: 
-1 Since each entry of the matrix D 
e: 
is bounded, we have proved that 
is bounded for e: sufficiently small. 
We will need the following lemma from [6]: 
Lemma 1.4 Let 'J{, be a given Hilbert space and T be a densely defined closed 
linear operator from dom(T) £]1, onto 31. with a bounded inverse II T-lil ~ c1, 
and let rex) be a nonlinear (Fr~chet) differentiable operator on H such 
that rCO) = 0, II r' (x)1I S c211 x II for all x E 3(.. Then for any a E 'H. 
, the equation 
Tx = a + rex) 
has l.n the sphere II x II < 4clll a II a unique solution " x E dom(T) satisfying 
o 
We note that although in [6, p.6, Lemma 2] , it is assumed that T be 
bpunded, a careful examination of the proof shows that that assumption is 
redundant. 
Using T = De' c1 = K4 and c2 D K1 in Lemma 1.4 and applying it to 
(1.1S), we obtain that for 
II P ell 2 [ 2 N 
L xL] 
n n 





(1.20) has a solution ~ ~ ~) E [Hl ]N+lx u2 x [Hl ]N+l (<'C",n""/';,,, ~ ~ ~ on nO 
satisfying 
14 
E j) II (-PO' p) II [L 2] N+ 1 
n 
From (1.7), writing 
~ ~ 
xe = x 
~ ~ 
uE = u 










~ ~ .... 
, XE = X + ~e,l 
'" 
,.. 
+ n 1 v E = v e, 
'" 
- E B.u . i 1. E,l. 
1 :: i :: N, 
[2K1K! II (po,p)1I [L2]N+l]-l 
n 
15 
'" "" " " J'(x U 'X v ) = 0 and 
e: e:' e:' e:' e: 
II x - x II 2 = II ~e: 0 II 2 
e: L 'L 
n n 
e:·)11 (po,p)1I 2 N+l 
J [L ] 
n 
similarly, 
II 2 ;." " )" II -- (x - Ax - E B,ue: . - f - Po 2 e:O e: e: i 1 , 1 L 
n 
c 
The proof of Theorem 1.2 is complete. 
16 
Remark 1.5 From the proof given above, we see that assumption (B7) can be 
relaxed; we need only require that the mixed partial derivative operators 




2 J at (x,u;X,v). 
x x u x u 
CJ 
Remark 1.6 Although Je(x,u;X,v) is concave in (x,v) for all 
in general it is not necessarily true that Je(x,u;X,v) 1S convex 1n (x,u). 
Thus A A ,... ,... (x€,ue;Xe,ve ) need not be a saddle point for J e • Compare Lemma 2.2 later. 
a 
Corollary 1.7 Under the conditions of Theorem 1.2, assume, in addition, that 
J(x,u;X,v) is quadratic in the sense that 
J(i,u;x,v) = J(x,u;X,v) + 2J'(x,u;X,v) • (x-x, u-u; X-X, v-v) 
+ < J"(x,u;X,v) • (x-x, u-u; X-X, v-v), (x-x, u-u; X-X, v-v) > 
holds for all (x,u;X,v), (i,u;X,v) E H~n x U x [H~n]N x U. Then Theorem 1.2(i) 
can be strengthened to 
(1.27) 
Proof: Since J is quadratic, so 
of Theorem 1.2. By (1.18), we have 
'" F,:e 









K' ( max 2 O:sj~N 
Therefore r(;,n) = a in the proof 
17 
For EO""'~ sufficiently small, it is easily seen that there exist 
such that 
(1.29) Ksli (f;,n,l,;)II 2[ 2]N+1 2 [ 2]N+l + !! DE(f;,n,l,;)112 [2]N+l 2 [ 2]N+1 L xU x L L xU x L 
n n n n 
~ ~II (f;,n,l,;)112 [ 1 ]N+1 2 [1 ]N+1 
HO xU x H 
n no 
( ~ r) E [H1 ]N+1xU2X[H1 ]N+1 for all ~,n,~ on nO' thanks to the coercivity 
Combining (1.28) and (1.29) with Theorem 1.2(i), we conclude (1.27). 0 
§2. Penalty for Linear Quadratic Differential Games. Finite Element Error 
Analysis. 
For each (the i-th) player, we let his cost functional be of the same 
form as in [4]: 
T 
J.(x,u) = ~ f [!c.(t)x(t) - z.(t)!2 + < M.(t)u.(t), u.(t»] dt. 
1 01 1 11 1 
By (1.3), we have 
N 
(2.1) JE(x,u;X,v) - t ! 
iZl1 
T 
1 [Ic.(t)x(t) - zl·(t)12 + < M.(t)u.{t), u.(t) > o 1 1. 1. 1. 
Consider 
(2.2) 




Using the notations in §1, we have 











M1 ". 0 1 
o .~. 
From now on, assume that the operators * C.C., 1 < i <_ N, are all invertible. 
1 1. 
Then .JO' -~, '1Ilo and -1\ are positive definite, and (BS) will be met. 
For any given (x,u) E H~ x U, define 
(2.3) max 
(X, v)€ [H~n] NxU 
if the maximum is-attained. 
18 
19 
Lemma 2.1 (i) J€(x,u) in (2.3) is well-defined. 
(ii) If Bl, .•. ,BN are relatively smaller than Ml""'~' then J€(x,u) is strictly 
convex in (x,u), and 
(2.4) lim lI(x,u) II 1 
HOnx U 
:a + 00. 
Consequently, min J€(x,u) has a unique solution. 
1 (x,u)EHonxU 
Proof: Since Jg(x,u;X,v) is strictly concave in (X,v), negatively coercive, 
i.e. , 
lim Jg(x,u;X,v) II (X,v)lI~ 
= _ (X) 
, 
we see that for any given (x,u), max J€(x,u;X,v) is uniquely attained at some 
(X,v) 
" " (Xg(x,u),Vg(x,u». Solving max Jg(x,UjX,v) is equivalent to solving 
(2.5) max 
(X,v)E [H~ NxU 
(X,v) 
~ [J ( i ) + L II x· i _ Axi 
" . x ,ul '.·. u. l' v. , u. 1 J ••• , ll... i ~ ~- ~ ~+ N gi 
B.u. -B.v. - f 112). 
J J ~ ~ 













B.u. - B.v. - f = 0, J J ~ ~ ~i(O) = 0, i = 1,2, ••. ,N. 
- E B.u. - B.v. - f 112] 




From (2.6), we have 
20 
t t 
J ~(t,s) [L B.(s)u.(s)]ds + J ~(t,s)[B.(s)v.(s) + f(s)]ds. 
o j ri J J 0 1. 1. 
Thus 
(2.5 ) > - L J.(xi,ul,.··,u. 1,v'Ju'+1""'~.) 
• 1. 1.- 1. 1. ~ 
1. 
t t 
= - E {II C.( J ~(t,s) [l: B.(s)u.(s)]ds + J ~(t,S)(B.(s)V.(S) 
i 1. 0 j isi J J 0 1. 1. 
+ f (s)] ds) - z. (t) 112 + < M. v. , v . >} • 
1. 1. 1. 1. 
Hence 
.JE(x,u)::: E J.(X,U) + L II x - Ax - E B.u. - fl\2 + (2.5) 
1. 1. EO i 1. 1. 
{E (IIC.X - Z.1I2+ < H.u.,u.>] 
.1.1. 1. 1. 1. 
1. 
+.L II i - A.'C - E. B.u. - fll2 
EO 1. 1. 1. 
t 
- II C. ! ~(t,S) [l: B.(S)U.(s>]dsIl 2 } 
1. 0 jri J J 
t t 
- 2{ E<C. J ~(t,S) E B.(s)u.(s)ds, ! ~(t,S)[B.(s)v.(S) + f(s)]ds>} i 1.0 '.J.' J J 0 1. 1. 
JT1. 
-+ remaining terms involving only v. and f. 
1. 
As II (x,u) II 1 ~ ~, the first parenthesized term, which is quadratic, 
HQnXU 
dominates the second. Since we have assumed that Ml"'.,MN are positive 
definite and sufficiently larger than Bl ••..• BN, we see that the first 
parenthesized term is positive definite in ul •••• '~. Hence (2.4) is proved. 0 
Lemma 2.2 If Bl, ••• ,BN are relatively smaller than Hl' ••• 'MN such that 
Je(x,u;X,v) is strictly convex and coerive in (x,u) for each given v, then 
the saddle point property 
(2.7) 
holds for all E. 
= max 
(X,v)E[Hl ]NxU On 
J (x,u;X,v) 
E 
Proof: We know that Je(x,u;X,v) is always strictly concave and negatively 
coercive in (X,v). From the proof of Lemma 2.1, we easily see that when 
strictly convex and coercive in (x,u) for each given (X,v). 
The saddle point property (2.7) follows in the some manner as the proof 
of Theorem 4.4 in [4]. 
Now it is not hard to see that all of the assumptions of Theorem 1.1 are 
met, and by Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 we see that the saddle point (i£'~e:;x£,~£) 
is determined by solving 
= 0 , 
= 0 , 
= 0 
Thus we can make a direct variational analysis on Je: and obtain 
21 
c 
" A ~ "" Je:'(X ,U ;X ,V ) • (OX,OU;OX,OV) • 0 
e: e: e: e: 
= 
N 
[ ~ ~ ~i E < C.Xe: - Z. ,C. (OX) > + < H.u . ,ou. > - < C.Xe: i=l ~ ~ ~ ~ e:,~ ~ ~ Z. ,C. (OX~) > ~ ~ 
22 
2 ~ • 




- E B. (ou .) - B. (ov.) > 
·4· J J 1 1 Jr1 
for all (ox,ou;oX,ov) E s5n x U x [~n]N x U. This gives the following 
variational equation 
,. 
-ox OX x 
e: 
t\: eU eu (2.8) ae: ( ) = e e: ( ) 
Xe: oX oX 
0e: OV OV 
where a is a bilinear form defined by 
e: 
~l ~2 
~l ~2 N 
a ( ) E [<c.£ ,C.~ > + <M·~l ., > C ~i - ~2 . < i'::'l' E 
=h =2 i=l 
~ -1 1 2 ~ ,1 ,1 
V 1 L V2 
and 6e: is a linear form defined by 




[< <z. ,C. ?:i> ] 2 • e ( ) = E z. ,C.;> - +- < f, ;-M,;-E B·ll· > £ .. i 1. l. 1. l. £0 1. 1. 
V 
_ 'to 2 f ~i 
t. - < , 
i £i 
A=i 'to B B 
- no::! - t. .ll. - .V. >, j'/'i J J 1. 1 
We assume that 3r > 0 such-that for all £ sufficiently small, a£ satisfies 
;1 E;2 
(Hl) inf sup a ( ll1 112 ) > r > o. 
r E;1 E -S2 =-1 -2 
II 
112 II H=l l ~l V1 V2 .. II ?:1 IIH=l 
-2 
V2 V1 _ 
How realistic 1.S the above assumption? This is partly answered in 
Proposition 2.3 If Bl, •.. ,BN are comparatively smaller than Ml, ••• ,MN, 





3l.1· - AEl.1· - E B.lll . - B,V1 . = -~11' + A?:i + E B.ll1 . + B1V1 ,l." j'/'i J , J 1,1 1 j;i J , J 
311' (t) = -?:1.1· (t) + 2 fot ~(t,s) [E B.lll . + B,Vl .]ds, j;i J,J 1,1 
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then t,;l ~2 f;1 f;1 
(2.10) J..l1 J..l2 ) 1 J..l 1 J..l 1 sup a ( > II (f;1 .J..lr;~I' -v~IIH a ( ) ;2 e: =1 e: ':'2 ':'1 ':'1 
II 
ll2 VI V2 V1 VI 
=2 II H=l 
V2 
t 
+ < C';=~l' J c'.; [=~l' - 2 f <I>(t.s) (E B·J..ll . + Bl VI .)ds]> + < M,Vl . J VI .>] 
...... 0 j ~i J J J J ~ ~ • ~ J ~ 
+ L II tl - A;l - E B .lll . 112 + E L II 2~1' - A=~l - E B .lll . - B. VI .112. 
e:O i ~ ,~ i e:i j~i J , J ~, ~ 
But 
> 
The second term above can be absorbed into a fraction of 
E [<M'll l ., III • > + < M''''l ., Vl .>] provided that Ml , ••• ,M-- are comparatively . ~,~,~ ~.~,~ -~ 
1 
larger than Bl, ••• ,BN, i.e., we have 
(2.11) LHS of (2.14) > 
+ < M 11 11 > + < c:: i c:: i > < M ,,>] 2 II; E i~l,i' ~l,i i-I' i-I + iVI,i' vl,i + e:O ~l - A 1 
for some a: 0 < a < ~. 
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Let a E (0,1) be fixed. For the terms on the RHS of (2.11), if 
(2.12) 
i III 1, ••• ,N, 
then we easily observe that 
(RHS) of (2.11) Zf>O , for some r independent of (E;l' 11 ; =1' "1) , 
is satisfied. 
If, on the contrary, say, for i = 1, we have 
(2.13) 
while the rest of (2.12) remains valid, then (2.13) gives 
(2.14) 1I§1- ABlll2 + II ~ B.ll • + B1"l,l 112 ~ a€111311- AB11112 + 2 < 3i - AB~, 1 1 j=2 J l,J 
N 
~ B·~l . + B1"1,1 > j=2 J ,J 
N • N (1-~e1)IIEll - AS1111 2 + II Z Bj~1 j + B '\)1 1"2 :s ~IIS11 - ASlll2 + 411 ! B ~ + B1"1,1"2 j =2 ' 1, 1 j =2 j l,j 
N 
(1 - ~~\ -!t;) 1I~1_ ASl1l2:s 3 II.Z Bj~l j + B1"1,1"2. J=2 ' 
Hence 
1. (1 - a~ - 1) 11-_:11 - A=11112 . 3 "'1 '4 n,;; 
Because M., 1 < i < N are positive definite operators considerably larger than 
1. 




N [<M'~l ., ~1 .> + <M'''l ""1 .J ~ II 1: B·).11 . + B1"11112 1. , 1. , 1. l., 1. , 1. j =2 J , J , 
for some a I ;: 0 < a I < 1. Therefore, for some a" < a, a" > 0, we have 
+ < M·).11 ., 
1. ,1. 
Hence the LHS of (2.11) is again ~ r> 0 for some f, independent of 
W& now let be a (TO,l)-system ([lJ, [4J) and let 
. 2 
Shl. C L (O,T), i = 1,2, ... ,N be Ct',O)-systems, and denote 
m. 
1. 
(2.16) o N i NON Sh = Sh x ( IT Sh) x ( IT Sh) x ( IT S~ ) 
i=l i=l i=l 






lH~) inf sup 
a- ( 
).11 ).12 ) ~ fh ~ f > 0, 'V h, f,~ 1 f,h Co , ...h =h 1 
-1 -2 
h h h h 
1/ 







wherein h h ~h h (f,l,lll;=l'''l)' h h ~h h (f,2,1l2;=2'''2) E Sh' It should be noted that if 
26 









(X,v)E( IT Sh)x( IT S~) 
i=l i=l 
Arguing in the same manner as in the early part of this section, we see that 
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(2.17) leads-to finding the solution of the variational equation 
"h oxh xe: 
"h ouh 
(2.18) a e ( 
ue: 
"h OXh X€ 
( ) , h h h h (ox ,au ,ox ,ov ) E She 
"h ovh ve: 
Let be a basis for So x Sl x x h h··· 
Then (2.18) is a matrix equation ~ qh = e~ , where the matrix ~ and the 
-h vector 8e; have entries 
[~J .. = a (~.,~.) 
e: ~J e: ~ J ; ~·,W· E Sh' ~ J 
for all 
- - - i ~ = (,,,io i ,,,iN ~~l ~i2 ~iN J.i 1 J.i 2 - N» 
i "'0' (W1
1
'···''''N ), ("'0 ' "'0'···' 1jI0 ), ("'1 ''''2 ,···,WN 
N 
i, j: 1 ~ i, j ~ (N + 1)10 + 2 E j=1 
I., where in the above, 
J 
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Blockwise, we can write 
~(lJl) ~(1,3) -h Me:(l,4) 
~(2.1) ~(2,2) ~(2,3) ~(2,4) 
-h }f- = 
e: 
~(3,l) ~(3,2) -h Me:(3,3) ~(3,4) 






r, h N i o ' 2 i i . lM (1,1)]. . = E [< CkIjJO' C IjJJo > + - <~ 0 - AljJoO, ~ojo - AIjJJ o >] 
e: 10Jo k=l k 0 e:O 0 
R. = l,2, •.. ,N; 
_ 
{
laToa sgn a 
if a::f 0 
if a = 0; 
~(3,1) :: OJ 
~(4,1) :: OJ 
[~(2,2)] 
E max(1,t-1) max(1,p-1) 
(j~1 Ij.Sng(j-1)+it)(k~1 ~-sgn(k-l)+ip) 
i1 iii 
=Opn<MnIVn, IVP>+!....<BIV t BIV P >- ~ (1-0.) (1-0.)!.... ~ ~ ~ P EO 1 l' P P i=l 11 1p Ei 
it i 
0< B1IVt ' B IV P >, P P 
1 ::: p, i < N· 1 < ii ::: Ii; 1 < - , 
-
-
i < I . 
P p' 
2 it i i 
= (1-6 ) -- < B ,I, J. P-kla P >. pi E i~i '~O % ' i 
1 < i < 10 ; p -
[M-h (4 ,2)] 
E (max(1,t-1)I (. 1)+· )(max(1,p-1)L (k 1)+· ) E .-sgn J- 10 E -k-sgn - 1 j=1 J ~ k=1 P 
i i 
= - (1-0 )!.... <B IV i B 1jJ P >. Pi Ei t 1 ' p p , 
1 5 p,i 5 N; 1 < i < I . 
- P - P 
29 
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1 :s p,t ~ N; 
[~(4,4)] (1 1) max(1,p-1)I (. 1) . ) E max ,p- I _ (·-1)+·)( ~ J.- sgn J- +1p ( L . sgn J 1t.~ 
J J=l j=l 
1 ~ p,t :s N; 
* 
and ~(q,r) = M~ (r,q) for q < r, 1 5 q,r 5 4; 
= 
N 1· 2 • • ~ C ,I. 0 + _ < f -1 1 ~ < z., ·'YO Eo ,\jJOO- A\jJOO>; i=l 1. 1. 
1 ~ t :s N; 
31. 
Theorem 2.4 Let {Sh} be a one-parameter family of finite element spaces 
as mentioned ~n (2.16). Let be the solution of (2.18) 
Let (x,u;i,v) be the solution of (1.2) 
Under (HI) and (H2), we have 
(2.19) II x~ - ill HI + II ~~ - ~II U + IIX~ - xII [Hl]N + II;~ - ;11 U 
n n 
SI N s2 S N N s2 
Hx(IIH )X[H]x(IIH) 
+ K' ( max 2 O~j~N 
n i=l mi n i=l mi 
for some constant KS > 0 independent of h,€ and (x€,~€;X€'~€)' where 
~ = min(TO-1,T,sl-1,s2)' (PO,p) is the dual multiplier, and K2 is the same 
constant as in (1.27). 
Proof: We use the triangle inequality 
Since a satisfies 
€ 
for some KS > 0 for all <\>, \jJ E H, by assumptions (Hl) and (H2), and 
[1,p.1S6], we have 
with ~ = min«~O-1)'T,Sl-1,S2). 
K 
(1 +! . 8 )h~ 
r m\1). e:. O~i~N ~ 
Combining (2.20), (2.21) and Corollary 1.7, we conclude (2.19). 
From Theorem 2.4, lve see that if 
then the error estimate is of the order of magnitude 
( N s2 H ) 




(2.22) h~ ( min 
O<i<N 
+ max e: . . 1 0<1<N 
e:.), 'V e:, 'Vh. 
1 
- -
Thus if we choose e:0 ,=e: l = ••• = e:N = e: and € =~(h~/2), the RHS of 
(2.22) is optimal and we have 
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§3. Duality and Penalty 
The relationship between penalty has already been indicated in Theorem 1.2: 
we see that the Lagrange multipliers 
,.. ,.. 
PO, ••• ,PN are actually the strong limits 
of (some scalar multiples of) the penalized differential equation, and the rate 
of convergence is O(€). 
Let us explore this relationship a little further here. Consider, as in (2.2), 
(3.1) max J€(x,u;X,v) (X,v)~[H~nlNxu 
- t ~ [II C.x - z. 
i=l 1. 1. 
112 +<M.u.,u.> - II C.xi - z.1I2 -<M.v., v.> 
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
_Lllx·i_Ax i _ ~ B B f112] l. .u. - .v.-
€i j~i J J 1. 1. - :B.u. i 1. 1. 
We can regard the above as a primal min-max problem subject to constraints 
• d ·1 d 1 ·N 






1 (x,u)EH xu 
On 
Thus, formally, we introduce Lagrange 
(3.3) d • N d i ei 
- J€(x,u;X,v) +< PO' -dt x - x> + 1: < P1..' - X - X > 
i=l dt 
For given PO,Pl"",PN E H~O' proceeding formal variational analysis as in 
[4], we get 
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N * A A * Ai ~ 1 A ~ L; {<I::. (C.Xe: - z.),ax> +<M.u ., au.> -<c.(c'Xe: - z.), ux >-<M~vj:';' uv.> 
i=l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ • ~ 1 
• 
A A * Ai _ AxAi A E B kUI="1, - B;vj:'~ - f), Qu.>-<B.(x e: - E Bku<:,tJ. 
k#i ~ • ~ J ~ E k;i ~ 
• N • A A A * A A A av.>]} + L« ox> -
- BiVe;i - f), x E -Ax - E B .ue:,j - f, <A (xE -Ax ~ EO E j=l J E 
A N * ~ A 
- E A au.>} • 
- E B.u . - f), ox> - E < B. (XE -Ax Bkue;k - f), - <Po' ox > J E,J E 
J j=l J k J 
N 
< d ~ > ~ [ ~ • i d ~xi» 
- dt Po' uX - t.. <Pi' uX> +<Wi' U = a 
i=l 
Thus, we get, for i = 1,2, •.• ,N, 
. 
* "- 2 * A 
-AX BjUE.J f) d (3.4) E c. (C ,xE - z. ) - - A (x - E - - Cit P = 0 J J J EO E E j j 
(3.5) * "i z· ) 2 * ~i - AX~ E B.u . - B.v . f) d -c. (C. x E - + - A (x - - - dt Pi = a ~ 1 1 E. E E j;i J e;.J ~ 9-~ 




- B,ve:' - f)1 = a ~ t1 
2 :.. 
-Po + €: (xE - AXE - E B.O . - f) = a o j J E)J 
B.O . 
J E).l B.v . - f) ::0 0 ~ er , 1 < i S N. 
Substituting PO' Pl"",PN from (3.8), (3.9) into (3.4) - (3.7), we get 
(3.10 ) d * N * A 
-dt Po = -A P + 1: c. (C,xe: - z.) 
o i=l ~ ~ ~ 




" -1 * u . = M. B.(PO + 1: p.) E;. ~ ~ 'J.' J JT~ 
A -1 * v . = -H. B. p. , 
e:,~ ~ ~ ~ 
. 35 
wherein for p., i = 0, 1, .•• , N, the terminal conditions p.(T) = 0 has 
~ ~ 
been imposed. 
Comparing (3.10), (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13), respectively, with [4, 
(3.9), (3.6), (3.10) and (3.7)],we find that they are correspondingly 
identical. If we assume as in [ 4, (A1») that 
(3.14) * C.C. (1 < i ~ N) are positive definite, 
~ ~ 
then we have 
(3.15 ) * !Co - 1: C.C.; i ~ ~ 
• 
* " (3.16) xe: = A[!C~l(p + A p + 1: c.z. )J ~ ~ + 1: [ -1 * B. M. B. (PO ~ ~ 1 + 1: e:O Pj)J + f + -p 2 0 i i j=i 
Ai -1 • 
* * * (3.17) xe: = -!C. (p. + A p. - C.z.). !C. 
-
C.C. , 1 ~ i ~ N; 1 ~ 1 1 ~ 1 1 1 1 
(3.18) 
-1 * e:i 
- B.M. B.p. - --2 P1" 1 1 1 1 1 < i < N. 
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d. d i ·i Integrating by parts for the last terms <PO' dt x - X> + ~ < Pi' dt x - x > 
1. 
in (3.3) and using (3.15) (3.18) to substitute Pi' Pi' 0 < i < N for 
..... .......... .... 
ue;l , ... • u~, v~, •.• ) v~, we get 
-
Lg(PO'p) : min1 (x,u)EHOnxU 
maxl N (X,v)E[H" ] xU 
vn 
1· * -1· * + -2 E<P1.. + A p., ~. (p. + A p.) > 1. 1. 1. 1. 
1. 
-1 * 
+ <PO + E Pi' E B.M. B.p.> i i 1. 1. 1. 1. 
* 
-1 N 
* • * -1 * 
-
< P + A PO' ~O E C.z. >- E< p. + A p., ~. C.z. > 0 i=1 1. 1. • 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 
1 a:-1(E * * + 1 E II z. 112 - < Po + 1: Pi' f> < C. z. ), 1: C.z.> 2 o . 1. 1. 1. 1. 2 . 1. 
1. 1. 1. 1. 
which differs from [4, (4.3)] only by - t eu II Po 112 + t ~ gi II Pi 112. (The 
1. 
term < Po (0) + ~ Pi (0), xO> vanishes because Xo = 0). These two terms do 
1. 
-
not affect the convexity of Po and the concavity of P in Lg(PO'p). Thus 
we conclude that the dual of the penalized problem is just an g-perturbation 
of the dual problem. 
We compare briefly the amount of computing involved in the dual and the 
penalty methods. Assume that in the error estimate (2.19) 8 1 and s2 are 
sufficiently large and that 
lim 




For simiplicity, we only consider n ~ m1 ... ... ~ • 1. In order 
that ~, the penalty solution, converges to i with the same rate as 
II ~ - x II in [4, (6.21) ](where ~ is the duality solution), we must choose 
e: -e: ... U 1 
... ,.. 0.,. ht(h~/2) 
• •• c.N v 
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, with ~ ... ~ in (2.19) and ~ ... 2~, where ~ is the same ~ in [4, (6.21»). 
This implies that 
- -TO - 1 = T = ~ = 2~. 
Assume also that in [4,Theorem 6.2] that t is sufficiently large so that ~ ... ~ - 1. 
Thus, using the same h = TIM in both approaches by dividing the interval 
[o,TI into M equal parts, the finite element space Sh (in [41 Theorem 6.2) 
has (N + 1) • (~+ 1 ) basis elements, while the finite element space 
Sh in (2.16) has (N + 1) • (2~ + 1 ) + 2N[(21J.-1) M + 11 basis 
elements, assuming that = S~ = a (~,O)-system. Thus the 
corresponding matrix equations 
(3.19) (cf. [4,(6.10)]) 
(3.20) 
have respective sizes 
~: [(N+1). (~+1)]2 
~: [(N+1) • (2~+1) + 2N(2~-1)M+2N12 
Thus the ratio of computing time between (3.19) and (3.20) is 
(3.21) [ (N+1) (M!J.+1) J3 (N+1)(2MIJ.+l)+2N(2~-1)M+2N 
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It appears to us that even after we take into account the sparseness 
and block structures of the matrices Mb -e and Mb, the above ratio is still 
valid asymptotically. Therefore we see that the dual method is much more 
efficient than the penalty method, especially when the number of players 
N is large. 
Nevertheless, the dual method is feasible only under assumption 
(Al) in [4], which requires the invertibility of El, ••• ,EN and is 
therefore quite restrictive. Computationally, the penalty method is 
not restricted by such a condition. 
4. Numerical Results 




x(O) = 0 
o < t < T, T = n/4 
which is a 2-person non zero-sum game and is known to have a unique 
equilibrium strategy for all T > o. 
JE(x,u;X,v) is given as in (2.1). We choose for a 
f d . 1· .. f 1 d 2 system 0 qua rat1C sp 1nes as approx1mat10n spaces or x, x an x, 
and for s~, s~ a (L,O) = (2,0) system of piecewise linear finite elements 
as approximation spaces for ul ,u2,vl and v2• 
It is not difficult to see that conditions (B1) - (BS) and (B7) in 
§1 are all satisfied. We are, however, unable to verify (B6); similarly, 
nor are we able to verify the validity of (Hl) and (H2) in §2. 
Our numerical results are plotted in the following figures. We 
n E = E = E :: E. use h = -/32 and 4 012 
In the first three figures, we use E = 10-1 , 10-2 , 10-3 , -4 10 and 10-S 
respectively. 
Figure 1 contains graphs of ul' versus time t, for various values of E. 
Figure 2 contains graphs of u2• 
Figure 3 contains graphs of x. 
The trajectories of u1' u2 and x versus various values of E cluster closer 
and closer as E becomes small. 
39 
, 
Figure 4 shows two graphs of ul • The solid line represents numerical 
data obtained from duality in [4}, with (4,1)-cubics and h = t/32. The 
broken line represents data obtained from penalty, with (3,1)-quadratics 
for state and (2,0) piecewise continuous linear elements for strategies 
also with h = ~/32, and 
Figure 5 shows two graphs of u2 ' obtained in the same fashion as Ule 
~ Figure 6 contains two graphs of x. 
From Figures 4 and 5, we see that numerical results for ul and u2 obtained 
from duality and penalty show remarkable agreement. In Figure 6, we see 
that the two graphs of x agree very well everywhere except at the initial 
and terminal time 0 and T, where the duality graph is rougher and less 
accurate. 
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We list values of at selected points in Table 1. 
All of our calculations were carried out with double precision. 
The values of J€ are obtained as follows: 
J = 0.5159708038688868 x 10-1 , e: = 10-1; e: 
Je: = 0.5698840889975811 x 10-1, e: = 10-
2 ; 
Je: = 0.8583978319547797 x 10-
3
, e: = 10-3 ; 
Je: = 0.3287468594749820 x 10-3 , e: = 10-
4 ; 
Je: = - 0.1245174244833003 x 10-
3
, e: = 10-5 . 
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TT In the following table, we use h = 4/32 and use the following to denote 
Pl : penalty solution with e: =E: =e: =10-
3 
012 
P2 : penalty solution with e: =e: = 
e: =10-5 
0 1 2 
D: duality solution 
1 1T 1 1T 3 1T 1T 
t = - • - t = - • - t = - . - t = - = T 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 
P1 -2.077473 -1.238577 -0.562432 0.000086 
u1 
P2 -2.078433 -1.239262 -0.562789 -0.004539 
D -2.064450 -1.229223 -0.556116 0.0 
Pl ().440848 0.285103 0.131847 -0.000053 
P2 0.441103 0.285264 0.131923 -0.002366 u2 
D 0.436094 0.281693 0.129746 0.0 
P1 -0.125946 -0.136808 -0.053823 0.118535 
x P2 -0.125870 -0.136707 -0.053713 0.118661 
D -0.126924 -0.137191 -0.053709 -0.250000 
Table 1 
Re~ark: The above are rounded-off figures with 6 decimal place accuracy. 
Example 2 (The Primal-Finite Difference Method) 
We return to the primal approach in Part I [4]. Consider the same example as 
in Example 1: 
(4.2) min max J(x,u;X,v) 
(x,u) (X,v) 
42 
uhere (x,u;X,v) is subject to the differential constraints (DE) = 0, 
[DE) = 0, x(O) = 0, X(O) = o. 
We discretize the differential constraints by the crude Euler finite 
difference scheme. For example, (DE) = 0 is discretized as 
(4.3) 
x(t i +l ) - x(t i ) N h = A(t.)x(t.) + E B.(t.)u.(t.) + f(t.) , i = O, .•. ,M-l. 
~ ~ j=l J ~ J ~ ~ 
Substituting (4.3) (and others) into (4.2), we proceed to solve the min-max 
problem. 
We use M = 32 and h = */32 and the primal approach to compute Example 1. 
The following values are obtained at selected points: 
1 7T 1 7T 3 7T t = l!. = T t = - • - t = - • - t = - • -4 4 2 4 4 4 4 
u1 -2.0416074 -1. 2191050 -0.5541710 0.0 
u2 0.4394483 0.2837087 0.1311784 0.0 
x -0.1244138 -0.1363107 -0.0565919 0.1097617 
Table 2 
The reader may compare the values in Table 2 with those in Table 1. 
Example 3: Consider again the following 2-person nonzero-sum game 
{
X(t) = x(t) + cos t . u1 (t) + sin t . u2(t) + 1, 
x(O) = 0, 
T 1 2 1 2 
J 1 (x,u)= f [Ix(t) - d1 (cos t + 2) I + 3 u1(t)]dt, o 
T 
J 2 (x,u)= f [Ix(t) - d2 o 
sin 212 tl + 2 u2(t)]dt, 
-- ----
o ::: t ::: I, 
43, ' 
where T - 2rr and (d1 ,d2) - (-1,0.9), as in [4,§7,Examp1e 3]. It 
is not clear to us whether the assumptions in [4] or in this paper are 
satisfied by this problem. However, as noted in [4,§7,Examp1e 3J, the 
values of L seem to be divergent. 
Let us manage to compute the numerical solutions in a straightforward 
manner, using h = 2rr/32. In Figures 7-9, the graphs of u1 ,u2 and x 
are plotted. The solid lines always represent the duality solutions of 
ul ,u2 and x, while the broken lines represent the penalty solutions of 
and x, using -3 and -4 u1 , u2 e = e = e = e = 10 10 ,respectively. 0 1 2 
It can be seen from these graphs that smaller values of e cause 
futher deviations between the penalty and duality solutions, if h is 
not adjusted according to e. This offers partial evidence that e and h 
are coupled in the error bounds (2.19). 
We have also plotted the graphs of 
t with e = 10-1 , 10-2, 10-3, 10-4 and 
The computed values of J 
e 
are 
J = 0.4582465783358920, e 
J = 0.2730100141206180, 
e 
J = 0.1231759476555612, e 
J = 0.9989590297527213, 
e 
J ~ 0.301145ll25450394x103, 
e 
Compare the results in [3]. 
u1 , u2 and x, respectively, versus 
10-5 , in Figures 10, 11 and 12. 
e = 10-1 • , 
e = 10-2• , 
e = 10-3• , 
e = 10-4 • , 
e = 10-5 
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Figure 3: The Penalty Solution of the State x 
Throughout Figures 1, 2 and 3, we use the following legend: 
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Figure 4: Comparison of the Penalty and Duality Solutions of u
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Figure 6: Comparison of the Penalty and Duality Solution of x 
Throughout Figures 4, 5 and 6, the solid curve (1) represents the 
duality solution while the broken curve (2) represents the penalty 
-3 n 
solution, with €0=€1=€2= 10 , both use h = 4/32. 
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